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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1776, our Constitution's Framers formulated the concept of federalism as one of the core principles upon which our bifurcated political system is based. At the center of this structure is a federal
government whose authority is limited to specific enumerated powers
within the Constitution. Among these enumerated powers sits the
Commerce Clause.1 Though the power created by this clause was
originally intended to be definite and narrow, it has become the life
force of an omnipotent Congress which is now threatening the concept
of federalism.
Apart from a brief period in the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court has consistently interpreted the Commerce Clause to grant
Congress virtually limitless power. 2 Over the past seventy years,
Congress has used this unbridled power to intrude into areas traditionally considered within the exclusive domain of state sovereignty.3
The enforcement of criminal law is one of these exclusive state provinces. 4 Despite the limited federal criminal jurisdiction envisioned by

the Framers,5 the modern trend of federalizing criminal law is constantly enlarging this 'imited" jurisdiction. In its current federalization frenzy, Congress has created more than 3,000 federal criminal
statutes. 6 This trend has tainted the traditional principles of federalism upon which this country is founded.
In United States v. Lopez, 7 the Supreme Court deviated from the
modern trend in a decision that stunned both the political and legal
communities. The Lopez Court struck down § 922(q), also known as
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990.8 This decision marked the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. See infra part IIA-C.
3. See infra part II.C.
4. See infra note 165.
5. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
6. There are now more than 3,000 federal crimes on the books and this number is
ever-increasing. W. John Moore, The High Price of Good Intentions, NATAL L.J.,
May 8, 1993, at 1140.
7. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1988 ed., Supp. V). Section 922(q) was enacted on November
29, 1990 as § 1702 of the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104
Stat. 4789, 4844-45. Section 922(q) provides:
(q)(1)(A) It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a
firearm at a place the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.
(B) Subparagraph (A) should not apply to the possession of a firearm (i) on private property not part of school grounds;
(ii) if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so
by the State in which the School zone is located or a political
subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or political
subdivision requires that, before an individual obtain such a
license, the law enforcement authorities of the State or polit-
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first instance since 19369 that the Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute based on the Commerce Clause. The Lopez Court held
that due to the absence of a sufficient nexus between the mere possession of a firearm and interstate commerce, the statute was an unconstitutional exercise of the congressional commerce power.10 Yet,
despite an ideal opportunity, the Court bypassed issuing an opinion
that could have halted the current federalization trend.
This Note will critically examine the federalization of criminal law
and the impact this trend is having on both the federal judicial system
and the federalist structure of this country. Initially, this Note will
trace the history of the Commerce Clause which laid the foundation
for the unfettered modern commerce power. This Note will then analyze the reasoning relied upon in Lopez by both the circuit court and
the Supreme Court. Additionally, this Note will establish that the Lopez Court did indeed recognize the underlying issue of federalism;
however, it failed to effectively deal with the issue. Next, this Note
will illustrate the various problems that accompany the federalization
of criminal law. This Note will also set out the growing national recognition of this trend as a genuine threat to our federal system. Finally,
this Note will suggest a possible solution to the impending crisis that
faces our federal judiciary. It is the conclusion of this Note that if
something is not done to curtail this current trend to federalize criminal law, the principle of federalism upon which this country is founded
ical subdivision verify that the individual is qualified under

law to receive the license;
(iii) which is (I) not loaded, and

(II) in a locked container, or a locked firearms rack which is

on a motor vehicle;
(iv) by an individual for use in a program approved by a school in
the school zone;
(v) by an individual in accordance with a contract entered into
between a school in the school zone and the individual or an
employee of the individual;
(vi) by a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capacity; or
(vii) that is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while
traversing school premises for the purpose of gaining access
to public or private lands open to hunting, if the entry on
school premises is authorized by school authorities.
"School zone" is defined as "(A) in, or on the grounds of, a public, parochial, or
private school; or (B) within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public,
parochial, or private school." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25).
9. In 1936, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law prescribing maximum
hours for workers in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936). One
year later, the Court issued a landmark decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), which became the foundation for the expansive
modem commerce power.
10. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
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will be nothing more than an abandoned historic concept as we move
closer and closer to a federal police state.
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the Lopez decision, a brief overview of the history
of the Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the congressional commerce power may be helpful. The Commerce
Clause provides that "Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several States .... ."11 The Supreme Court

has never read this clause so expansively as to grant Congress infinite
power to regulate any activity it sees fit. It has consistently recognized that there are limitations.' 2 Nonetheless, the Court has historically, given this clause an extremely broad interpretation.' 3 It is from

this traditionally broad reading that Congress has derived its authority to continually institute new federal crimes, adding to the already
congested federal judicial docket.
A. Laying a Broad Foundation
In Gibbons v. Ogden14 the Supreme Court laid the framework for
this broad power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause. The
Gibbons Court held that a state may not grant an individual exclusive
navigation rights because it interferes with the stream of interstate
commerce.15 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall formulated a remarkably expansive definition of the word "commerce."'16
His definition encompassed "'every species of commercial intercourse'
which concern more states than one"17 and he gave an equally expansive definition to the congressional commerce power.' 8 Marshall defined the congressional commerce power as "the power to regulate;
that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I,

12.
13.
14.
15.

§ 8,

cl. 3.

See sources cited infra notes 21-26, 35, 74-78 and accompanying text.
See infra part II.A,C.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. Gibbons involved a dispute over navigation rights in New York waters. Gibbons had been granted exclusive rights by New York to transport passengers in
his steamboats between New York and New Jersey, effectively excluding out of
state competitors. Ogden began travelling the same waters under a 1793 federal
statute licensing ships in coastal trade. Gibbons filed suit seeking an injunction.
The Court held that a state may not grant exclusive rights that interfere with
interstate commerce, and that the federal statute preempted the state statute
granting the monopoly.
16. Id. at 196.
17. Debra L. Farmer, Note, United States v. Lopez. The Fifth CircuitDeclares the
Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 an UnconstitutionalExtension of Congressional
Power Under the Commerce Clause, 68 TuL. L. REv. 1674, 1676 (1994).
18. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
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This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the [C]onstitution.19 He stated
that, for purposes of the Commerce Clause power, commerce among
the states cannot stop at the external20boundary line of each State, but
may be introduced into the interior.
Despite his broad interpretation, it is unlikely that Marshall envisioned that the commerce power could or would reach the levels that it
has today. As the Lopez majority recognized, Marshall acknowledged
the existence of inherent limitations within the very language of the
Commerce Clause.2 1 Marshall noted that:
It is not intended to say that [the words 'among the several States'] comprehend that type of commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on
between man and man in a State, or between different parts in the same
State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power
would be inconvenient and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the
word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which
concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably

have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the
particular classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended, would
not have been
made, had the intention been to extend the power to every
22
description.

It is clear from this excerpt that Marshall did not intend for his interpretation of the Commerce Clause to grant Congress the power to regulate activities that are inherently local in nature. It is highly
unlikely that when using such sweeping language to describe the commerce power, Marshall foresaw that it would be interpreted to grant
Congress the power to regulate traditionally local activities and become the basis for a federal police power. 2 3
B. A Narrowing of Minds
For nearly a century after Gibbons, subsequent interpretations of
the Commerce Clause narrowed the broad commerce power established by Marshall and "aggressively protected state sovereignty from
federal encroachment."2 4 During this period, the Supreme Court's decisions remained relatively true to the concept of federalism and main19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627 (1995).
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824).
James M. Maloney, Note, Shootingfor an Omnipotent Congress:the Constitution.
ality of Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FoRuI _ L.
REv. 1795, 1805 (1994).
24. Erwin Chemerinsky, Changing Course: Lopez Limits Congressional Powers,
TRiAL, June 1995, at 86.
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tained a distinction between local and national commerce. 2 5 The
Court developed various categories and distinctions to protect certain
activities from federal regulation. It placed beyond the reach of Congress categories of activities, such as production, mining, and manufacturing, which traditionally fell within the exclusive province of the
states. 26 The Court also distinguished between direct and indirect effects and held that only activities directly affecting interstate commerce fell within the scope of federal regulation. 2 7 The development
of these strict restrictions on Congress' commerce power led to the inkey pieces of President Roosevelt's initial New
validation of many
Deal legislation. 28
C.

Source of Unfettered Modern Commerce Power

This era of narrow interpretation came to a close around the time
of Roosevelt's infamous court-packing plan.2 9 Although this attempt
to influence Court voting by increasing the Court's membership ended
in failure, a drastic shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence resulted.
The Court reverted to a more expansive interpretation of the commerce power, allowing a broader range of activities to fall within Con25. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1936)(striking down a federal law prescribing maximum hours for workers); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)(overturning a federal law prohibiting the sale of sick
chickens across state lines); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)(striking
down a federal statute prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
made by child labor)(overruledby United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941));
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17,20-22 (1888)(upholding a state prohibition on the
manufacture of intoxicating liquor because the "commerce power does not comprehend the purely domestic commerce of a State .... ."); Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 568, 573-75 (1853) (upholding a state-created steamboat monopoly because it involved regulation of wholly internal commerce).
26. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The Court articulated a
distinction between commerce and manufacturing, mining, and production. It
held that Congress lacked authority to regulate these exclusively state domains.
Id.
27. See A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935).
Activities which only affected interstate commerce indirectly were not subject to
federal regulation. Id. The Court held that the direct/indirect distinction was "a
fundamental one, essential.to the maintenance of our constitutional system." Id.
The Schecter Court justified making this distinction because of an existing fear
that "otherwise there would be no limit to the federal power and for all practical
purposes we should have a completely centralized government." Id.
28. Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 86.
29. Due to their consistent invalidation of his New Deal legislation, President
Roosevelt grew increasingly frustrated with the Supreme Court. In response, he
sought to enact legislation that would allow him to appoint an additional judge
for every sitting judge over the age of 70 who had served at least 10 years on a
federal court. This would have increased the Court's membership to fifteen. The
result would have been a majority on the Court favorable to President Roosevelt's
political ideology.
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gress' grasp.SO In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,3 ' the
Supreme Court upheld the National Fair Labor Relations Act and ultimately abandoned the dual-federalism structure separating local from
national commerce. 3 2 It abandoned the earlier distinction between
manufacturing and commerce, and it also abrogated the earlier direct
and indirect distinction.3 3 The Jones Court formulated a new test
when it held that Congress has the power to regulate intrastate activities that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions."3 4 Although this "substantial effect" test formed the basis for broad interpretations of the congressional commerce power, 3 5 the Jones Court explicitly
acknowledged that this power was not limitless. 3 6 The Court warned
that:
the scope of this power must be considered in light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex
national
society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
37
and what is local and create a completely centralized government.

Nevertheless, less than five years later, in United States v.
Darby,3 8 the Supreme Court provided further support for the expansive congressional commerce power set out in Jones. In Darby, the
Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act.39 This Act prohibits the
"shipment in interstate commerce of certain products and commodities produced in the United States under labor conditions as respects
wages and hours which fail to conform to the standards set up by the
Act."40 The rationale behind Darby was that the "power of Congress

over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce
among the states" and that Congress has the right to regulate intra30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Malo ney, supra note 23, at 1806-11.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Maloney, supra note 23, at 1809. Maloney noted that the "affecting commerce"
rationale created by Jones would soon take on "a life of its own." Id.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
Id.
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
Id. at 109.
Id. The Darby Court explicitly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251
(1918), which struck down a federal statute similar to the Fair Labor Standards
Act. The statute at issue in Hammer was the National Recovery Act which prohibited the shipment of goods that had been produced by child labor. The Hammer Court based its decision on the principle that congressional power to prohibit
interstate commerce is limited to articles which themselves have some harmful or
evil property. 247 U.S. at 271, 279. Darby held that this principle had "long
since been abandoned." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116 (1941).
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state commerce 41 that has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
This line of precedent broadening the commerce power culminated
in the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Wickard v. Filburn.42 In
Wickard, the Court held that wheat grown by a farmer solely for home
consumption fell within the reach of federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause.43 The Wickard Court extended the breadth of the
substantial effect test with its introduction of the aggregate impact
theory. This theory allows Congress to regulate activities that may be
trivial in themselves, but when "taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, [are] far from trivial."44 This decision "has
had far-reaching consequences in the area of federal criminal legislation 45 because it gave Congress the authority to regulate activities
that do not individually have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 4 6 Wickard provided an opening for congressmen, overly eager
to demonstrate to their constituents that they were tough on crime, to
enact federal statutes regulating local criminal activity. Wickard articulated an unprecedented view of an expansive congressional commerce power and further enhanced the federal government's power in
relation to and at the expense of the states.
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196447 the Court considered two major cases which resulted in the further expansion of the
congressional commerce power.48 Previously, when the Court applied
the substantial effects test to federal legislation, the legislation at issue regulated an activity that was commercial or economic in nature. 4 9 However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was social rather than
41. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)(emphasis added).
42. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
43. Id. At issue in Wickard was the 1941 amendment, 55 Stat. 203, 7 U.S.C. § 1340
(Supp. No. I), to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C-A. § 1340, 52
Stat. 31 as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1281 et seq., 7 U.S.C.A. § 1281 et seq. (limiting
the amount of particular crops that individuals were allowed to market).
44. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
45. Maloney, supra note 23, at 1811 (focusing on the interpretations of Wickard that
permit congressional legislation with social rather than economic aims).
46. Id. at 1811 (emphasis added).
47. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (1964)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a) 2000(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
48. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
49. Prior legislation focused on the regulation of some type of economic or commercial
activity. However, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shifted its focus in order to deal
with the national problem of discrimination which is a social problem, not an
economic problem. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)(upholding
the Agricultural Adjustment Act); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941)(upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); National Labor Relations Bd. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)(upholding the National Labor

Relations Act).
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economic in both nature and purpose. It provided that "all persons
shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities,... and accommodations of any place of public accommodation... without discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race,
color, religion or national origin."50 Because the Act was aimed at
eliminating a social evil, the Court had to establish an even broader
interpretation of the congressional commerce power in order to uphold
the legislation. In doing so, the Court simply deferred to Congress
based on the mere existence of a rational basis for their conclusion
that the legislation was necessary.
These civil rights cases are significant for two reasons. First, they
"signaled a willingness on the part of the Court to apply the Wickard
rationale regarding the 'aggregate effect of trivial instances' to legislation that had as its primary concern not economic concerns,... but
52
social ones."51 In both Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States
5
3
andKatzenbach v. McClung, the Court relied on the aggregate effect
that the actions of local proprietors would have on interstate commerce. These decisions have provided Congress a sufficient basis for
enacting federal criminal statutes. By simply applying Wickard's aggregate effect test, activities not remotely connected to interstate commerce may be regulated, even when the purpose of the regulation is
social in nature.
Second, these cases are significant because they formed the basis
for the modern exercise of judicial deference when legislative history
and findings are present. For instance, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the
Court based its decision on the "voluminous testimony" in the Act's
legislative history linking racial discrimination to interstate commerce. 5 4 The legislative findings indicated that discrimination
against blacks in the motel industry would discourage blacks from
traveling throughout the country. 5 5 Based on the adverse effect on
interstate travel in the aggregate, 6the Court upheld the Civil Rights
Act under the Commerce Clause.5
50. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (1964)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(a) 2000(b)(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
51. Maloney, supranote 23, at 1813. The discriminatory actions by a local motel or a

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

local restaurant owner, by themselves, would have little impact on interstate
commerce. However, in both cases, the Court utilized the Wickard aggregate impact theory and concluded that when the actions of all local proprietors were
taken in the aggregate, the effect of their discriminatory conduct would substantially affect interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 241, (1964).
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964).
Id. at 252-53.
Id. at 252-57.
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Similarly, in Katzenbach, the Court upheld the enforcement of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a restaurant owner who refused to
serve black patrons. 57 It based its decision on the legislative findings
which indicated that legislators had a rational basis for finding the
Civil Rights Act a necessary regulatory scheme for the protection of
commerce.58 These findings bore substantial similarity to those relied
upon by the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel, with the Katzenbach
Court concluding that in the aggregate, discrimination in restaurants
had an adverse effect on interstate commerce. 5 9 Thus, it is evident
that the Court placed significant import on legislative findings in its
decision to defer to Congress.
The Supreme Court dealt specifically with Congress' authority to
enact federal criminal legislation based on the commerce power in Perez v. United States.60 In Perez, the defendant was convicted under a
federal loansharking statute 6 1 and the Court held that this statute
was a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power.62
Although the defendant argued that the statute exceeded the scope of
congressional commerce power because the activities were completely
intrastate, the Court rejected this assertion. 63 Instead, the Court held
that the constitutionality of the statute hinged merely on a showing
that the defendant's activities fell within a class of activities within
the reach of federal power. 6 4 Similar to Wickard's aggregate impact
theory, this "class of activities" approach greatly enhanced Congress'
ability to enact federal criminal statutes. When examined within any
class of activity, every crime would undoubtedly have some affect on
interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress acquired the power to regulate crimes conducted purely at the local level, merely by placing the
particular activity into a "class of activities" that had some effect on
interstate commerce. 6 5
In addition to establishing the "class of activities" approach, Perez
has gained notoriety for two other reasons. First, the Perez Court explicitly stated that Congress "need [not] make particularized findings
in order to legislate". 66 This statement gave Congress free reign to
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.
66.

Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964).
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 304.
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 159-64 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-96 (1988)).
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971).
Id. at 154.
Id. The Perez Court essentially carried over to the province of criminal law the
application of the Wickard aggregate impact test to legislation with social aims as
it had done earlier in HeartofAtlanta Motel and Katzenbach. The Court simply
grouped the aggregate impact within a "class of activities." Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 152-59
Id. at 156.
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regulate under the Commerce Clause and indicated that the Court
would defer to Congress upon the mere statement of a connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. Perez eliminated the necessity of establishing an interstate nexus and it left open
to regulation purely intrastate activities that traditionally fell under
only state sovereignty. Second, Perez categorized particular activities
previously held to fall within the scope of the congressional commerce
power. 67 It determined that these activities fell into three categories:
1) the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being misused; 2) protection of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce; and 3) those activities affecting commerce. 68
Not long after the Perez decision, another challenge to a federal
criminal statute founded on the Commerce Clause presented itself to
the Supreme Court. In United States v. Bass,69 the defendant was
convicted of possession of a firearm under a provision of Title VII of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.70 This pro-

vision prohibited "any felon from receiv[ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] in interstate commerce or affecting interstate commerce...
any firearm."71 The key issue was whether the jurisdictional language "in commerce or affecting commerce" applied to "receiv[ing]"
and "possess[ing]", as well as to "transport[ing]." Essentially, the Bass
Court had to determine whether the government was required to
prove a connection between the possession of a firearm and interstate
commerce. 72 If the Bass Court read the statute at issue "to punish
mere possession without a commerce nexus ... it would intrude upon

an area of traditional state authority and would push Congress' commerce power to its limit, if not beyond."73 Ultimately, the Bass Court
held that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance....
[The Court] will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to
effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal
and state criminal jurisdiction."74 Therefore, the jurisdictional element set out in the statutory language applied to all three activities
67. Id. at 150.
68. Id. As recognized by the Lopez majority, § 922(q) falls within the third category.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995).
69. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
70. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (the relevant portions of the act were
subsequently repealed, but were originally codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1203).
71. Id.
72. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971).
73. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1347 (5th Cir. 1993)(using United States
v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) as the foundation for its analysis of the statute in

Lopez.).
74. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
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and required the prosecutor to prove a sufficient nexus between possession of a firearm and interstate commerce.
Moreover, the Bass Court "recognized that criminalizing simple intrastate possession may exceed Congress's commerce power."75 However, by resting its decision on statutory construction the Court
specifically avoided deciding whether Congress could constitutionally
punish mere intrastate possession under its commerce power. 7 6 This
issue was ultimately settled in 1995 when the Court decided United
States v. Lopez.
III.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez was a twelfth-grade student attending Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas. On that day,
school officials received an anonymous tip that Lopez was carrying a
gun in school. Based on this tip, Lopez was called to the principal's
office and questioned by a school policeman. After he confessed that
he had a gun, a school official searched Lopez and discovered an unloaded .38-caliber revolver in his waistband and five cartridges in his
trouser pocket.77 Lopez explained that in exchange for $40.00 he had
accepted the revolver from "Gilbert" and was to deliver it to "Jason"
who planned to use the gun in a "gang war" after school.78 Lopez was
initially arrested and charged under a Texas law which makes it a
crime to possess a firearm on school premises. 7 9 However, the next
day federal charges were filed under the Gun Free School Zones Act of
199080 and the state charges were subsequently dismissed.81 The
Gun Free School Zone Act made it a federal offense for "any individual
to knowingly possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."s2
A grand jury indicted Lopez on one count of knowing possession of
a firearm in a school zone in violation of § 922(q). He pled not guilty
and made a motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds that § 922(q)
was an unconstitutional exercise of federal power over public schools.
This motion was denied by the federal district court which held that
the statute was a constitutional exercise of the congressional commerce power.SS The district judge found Lopez guilty of violating
75. Maloney, supra note 23, at 1816 (citing discussion in United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 345-49 (1971)).
76. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971).
77. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
78. Id.
79. TELx PENAL CODE ANN.§ 46.03(a)(1) (West 1994).
80. See supra note 8.
81. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
82. See supra note 8.
83. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
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§ 922(q) and sentenced him to six8 months
imprisonment, two years
4
supervised release, and a $50 fine.
Lopez appealed to the Fifth Circuit on the sole ground that § 922(q)
was unconstitutional because it exceeded congressional authority to
legislate under the Commerce Clause. The Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court's conviction and held § 922(q) to be unconstitutional.s5
The circuit court began its opinion with a comparative analysis of
United States v. Bass.8 6 The Bass Court required that the government establish a nexus between the possession of a firearm and interstate commerce.8 7 Accordingly, in Lopez, the Fifth Circuit held that
all "federal laws proscribing firearm possession require the government to prove a connection to comnmerce." 8 The court then explicitly
noted the total absence of any nexus between § 922(q) and interstate
89
commerce.
The Fifth Circuit then traced the history of federal firearms legislation and examined the past relationship between such legislation
and interstate commerce and the findings upon which that relationship was based.90 The court recognized that, "[w]ith the exception of a
few relatively recent, special case provisions, federal laws proscribing
firearm possession require the goverment to prove a connection to
commerce, or other federalizing feature, in individual cases."91
Throughout its review of prior firearms legislation, the court distinguished § 922(q) from past statutes which did not explicitly require a
connection to interstate commerce. 92 The court distinguished 922(q)
based on the fact that these statutes dealt with "transfers, not mere
possession,"93 "highly destructive, sophisticated weapons,"94 and the
inclusion of language regarding airport x-ray machines.9 5 In light of
these distinctions, the court concluded that the constitutionality of
§ 922(q) could not be based on the existence of prior firearms legislation which lacked a nexus to interstate commerce.9 6
The circuit court's decision focused on the absence of any legislative findings or history indicating that the mere possession of a fire84. Id.
85. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
86. Id. (discussing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)).
87. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350-51 (1971)).
88. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1347 (5th Cir. 1993).
89. Id. at 1348.
90. Id. at 1348-60.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348-60.
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1356.
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1348-60.
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arm on school grounds substantially affected interstate commerce. 97
It noted that "[w]here Congress has made findings, formal or informal,
... the courts must defer 'if there is any rational basis for' the finding."98 The Fifth Circuit held that "courts could not properly perform

their duty.., if neither the legislative history nor the statute itself
reveals any such relevant finding."99 Although legislative findings are
not required, they are regarded as particularly important when dealing with the regulation of education and the control of firearms possession by ordinary citizens which have traditionally been state
responsibilities. 0 0 Therefore, the court held that, absent any congressional findings or legislative history, "section 922(q), in the full reach
of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power granted to Congress under
the Commerce Clause."01
Subsequent to the Fifth Circuit's Lopez decision, a similar case
challenging the constitutionality of § 922(q) came before the Ninth
Circuit.' 0 2 In direct contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit

held § 922(q) was constitutional. 0 3 In United States v. Edwards, the
defendant, Ray Harold Edwards, III, and three companions were
standing in the school parking lot near Edwards' car. A passing police
officer believed the group to be gang members and he called for backup. Subsequently, four officers and the school security guard approached the group. One of the officers received permission from Edwards to search his car. He then discovered a .22 rifle and a sawed-off
bolt-action rifle in the trunk. Edwards was charged with the unlawful
possession of a firearm in a school zone, a violation of § 922(q). Edwards filed a motion to dismiss asserting the unconstitutionality of
the federal statute; however, the Act was upheld.10 4 The Edwards
court based its decision on the idea that "violence created through the
possession of firearms adversely affects the national economy;" therezones is
fore, a statute regulating the possession of firearms in school
10 5
a constitutional exercise of congressional commerce power.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1362-64.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1367-68.
United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 291.
Id.
Id. at 293. (citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991) in which
the defendant was convicted for possessing an unregistered machine gun in violation of § 922(o)). In Evans, the Ninth Circuit utilized United States v. Perez to
guide their determination that it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that
possession of firearms represents a "class of activitfies which] affects interstate
commerce." United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
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The Ninth Circuit also held that legislative findings regarding a
particular activity's effect on commerce were not necessary.10 6 When
it issued its holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized that it
was creating an intercircuit split due to the Fifth Circuit's holding in
Lopez.10 7 The existence of this intercircuit split, combined with the
importance of the issue, led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.os
The Court ultimately resolved this split when it affirmed the Fifth Circuit decision that § 922(q) was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional commerce power.1 0 9
IV. ANALYSIS
On the surface, the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez appears to
be an abandonment of the traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence
that has dominated American law for over sixty years.' 10 Traditional
jurisprudence gave almost unquestioning deference to congressional
decisions to legislate under the Commerce Clause.113 In Lopez, the
Supreme Court departed from this stretch of absolute deference to
congressional legislation when it held that § 922(q) exceeded congressional commerce power.1 2 However, it is unlikely that the ultimate
impact of Lopez will truly reverse modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence and bring to a halt the politically charged trend of federalizing
criminal law. Despite the ideal opportunity presented in Lopez, the
Court's decision is not the landmark case it could have been. The Lopez Court failed to effectively deal with the underlying issue of federalism and adequately limit the congressional commerce power. A
stronger opinion could have clearly restricted Congress' ability to base
the formulation of federal criminal legislation on the Commerce
Clause.
A. An Economic Activity Analysis
The Supreme Court correctly reasoned that § 922(q) could not be
upheld under either the first or second categories of activity set out in
Perez.113 In order for the Act to be constitutional, the Court recognized that it must fall within the final category authorizing Congress
to regulate activities which substantially affect interstate com106. Maloney, supra note 23, at 1816.
107. United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993).
108. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536
(1994).
109. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
110. See supra part H.C.
111. See id. From 1937 to Lopez, not a single federal law based on the Commerce
Clause was held unconstitutional.
112. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
113. Id. at 1631.
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merce. 1 14 The Court examined past case law dealing with Commerce
Clause legislation falling within this category and it recognized regulation of an economic activity as a common factor that linked a majority, if not all, of these cases.11 5 Because § 922(q) did not involve the
regulation of an economic activity, it failed to meet the formula for
constitutionality developed by prior Commerce Clause decisions. The
Court described § 922(q) as "a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."116 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the statute could not be upheld because it lacked the
common connection with a commercial transaction, "which viewed in
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."117 Despite
government attempts to establish this crucial economic factor, the
Court recognized that the mere possession of a gun, whether in a
school zone or not, is not an economic activity upon which Congress
can exercise its commerce power.l18
B. Distinguished from United States v. Bass
Section 922(q) may be distinguished from the federal criminal statute at issue inBass.119 Although the statute in Bass did not deal with
the regulation of an economic activity, the Bass statute contained a
jurisdictional element based on the language "in commerce or affecting commerce.12o This jurisdictional language required the prosecutor to establish a nexus between the regulated activity and interstate
commerce as one of the elements of the crime. The statute in Lopez
lacked any similar jurisdictional element indirectly allowing for the
regulation of a noncommercial activity. Therefore, the Court held the
statute was an unconstitutional exercise of power, not only because it
did not regulate an economic activity, but also because it contained no
jurisdictional requirement that the possession of the firearms have
some connection to interstate commerce. 12 '
C. Necessity of Legislative Findings
The Fifth Circuit decision in Lopez placed significant weight on the
absence of legislative findings, formal or informal, establishing that
possession of a gun within a school zone substantially affects inter114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1630-31.
Id. at 1631.
Id. at 1633.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995)(comparing Lopez with
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971)).
120. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339 (1971).
121. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
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state commerce. 12 2 The Fifth Circuit held that, absent any such findings, it was impossible to determine whether the impact of the activity
in question substantially affected interstate commerce - by itself or in
the aggregate.123 However, the court consciously refrained from analyzing whether the legislation could be sustained if accompanied by
adequate legislative findings establishing an interstate commerce
nexus.12 4
Conversely, the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez was not rooted
in the presence or absence of legislative findings. In fact, the Court
explicitly agreed with prior holdings that "Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an
activity has on interstate commerce."' 25 The Court did note, however,
that congressional findings that could be utilized in evaluating the
statute's 2 6 constitutionality under the Commerce Clause were
lacking.1

In his dissent, Justice Breyer indicated that he did not consider the

absence of legislative findings particularly significant.32 7 Breyer
maintained that because § 922(q) did not interfere with the exercise of
state or local authority no legislative findings were necessary.128 In
absolute deference to Congress, Breyer determined that Congress'
mere conclusion that possession of a firearm on or near a school zone
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce was sufficient to uphold the statute. 2 9 Any establishment of an interstate commerce
nexus appeared to be immaterial to Justice Breyer.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court made no reference to an amendment to § 922(q) that passed as part of the Crime Bill in August
1994.130 "This amendment included explicit findings linking gun possession on school grounds to interstate commerce," '13 however, the
Court elected not to address whether these retroactive findings sufficiently established a satisfactory nexus with interstate commerce.
The Court's intentional avoidance of this issue is indicative that the
retroactive findings were not sufficient to support the statute's consti122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1359-63 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1368.
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995).
Id. at 1632.
Id. at 1658-62 (Breyer J., dissenting).
Id. at 1658.
Id. at 1658-62.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (1994). Section 320904 of this act amends § 922(q) to include congressional
findings regarding the effects of firearm possession in and around schools upon
interstate and foreign commerce.
131. David S. Gehrig, The Gun-FreeSchool Zones Act: The Shootout Over Legislative
Findings,the Commerce Clause, and Federalism,22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 179,

208 n.261 (1994).
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tutionality. Additionally, the Court's deliberate decision not to address the retroactive findings supports the fact that it would have
struck down § 922(q) as an unconstitutional extension of congressional commerce power, even if similar legislative findings had originally accompanied the statute.
Yet, absent a clear and explicit statement to this effect, the Court's
decision will never have the landmark impact it potentially could have
attained. As it stands, subsequent courts have interpreted the Lopez
decision narrowly and have maintained that if Congress makes any
legislative findings that the activity, even if wholly intrastate, affects
interstate commerce, then the judiciary must defer to Congress.1 3 2
This type of narrow interpretation leaves the door open for Congress
to continue to federalize almost every aspect of criminal law due to the
ease with which Congress can create superficial findings linking criminal activity to interstate commerce.
Although the Lopez Court clearly departed from over seventy years
of consistent jurisprudence dealing with the congressional commerce
power, 13 3 it failed to articulate the desired effect its ruling should
have on prior Commerce Clause tests and case law. It neither overruled any past cases, nor identified any historical tests that were no
longer to be applicable to the evaluation of the constitutionality of federal criminal legislation. This oversight allows lower courts to continue relying on earlier precedents which gave greater deference to
Congress in its decisions to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
Practically speaking, courts will be able to disregard the Lopez decision and limit its holding to its facts. Thus, the Supreme Court bypassed an ideal opportunity to specifically address the federalization
problem and establish a hard and fast rule limiting congressional interference in the traditional state realm of criminal law.
D. Recognition of the Real Issue
Although the Court's decision was not explicit in its dealing with
the underlying issue of federalism and the current trend of federalizing criminal law, its rejection of the government's arguments indicates
that it does in fact recognize the importance of federalism to our country. In its analysis of the government's case, the Court acknowledged
that judicial acceptance of the government's contentions would ulti132. See United States v. Mosby, 60 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 1995)(upholding 18 U.S.C
§ 922(g)(1) which prohibits possession of a firearm by a felon); United States v.
Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004 (11th
Cir. 1995)(upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2) (1988 Ed. Supp. IV) which prohibits
caijacking); United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 1995 WL 399070 (D. Kan. 1995)(upholding 21 U.S.C. § 860, otherwise known as the Drug-Free School Zones Act).
133. See supra part II.B.
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mately grant Congress a limitless commerce power.134 The Court recognized that the government's theory that violent crime adversely
affects the national economy and citizens' willingness to travel
throughout the country, would allow Congress to "regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce."135 Ultimately this could lead to the federalization of virtually every crime
in the United States.136 The Court rejected the government's arguments because under its theories "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement
7
or education where States historically have been sovereign.13 Acceptance of these arguments would leave the Court "hard-pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
38
regulate."1
1.

An Affront to Federalism

"As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system
of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government."'139 The essentially limitless congressional commerce power ultimately sought by Congress is an affront to this concept of Federalism
which is one of the cornerstones of the American government. The
dual form of government created by the Framers was a unique concept
aimed at protecting the fundamental liberties of citizens.1 40 It was
also intended to be used as a check on abuses of federal government
power.14' More specifically, "a healthy balance of power between the
States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front."142
According to the Constitution, the federal government is one of limited powers. The Tenth Amendment established that "the powers not
delegated to the United States, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."143 As stated by
James Madison, "[tlhe powers delegated... to the federal government
134. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632-33 (1995).

135. Id. at 1632.
136. See Transcript of Oral Arguments, 1994 WL 758950 (U.S.Oral-Arg.). During oral
arguments, Justice Scalia observed that under the government's rationale, "all
violent crime, if Congress so desired, could be placed under a Federal wing." Id.
at 10. Moreover, Solicitor General Days, arguing for the government, conceded
that under his rationale there is no limitation "that would preclude [Congress]
from reaching any traditional criminal activity." Id. at 13.
137. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
138. Id.
139. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).

140. Id. at 458.
141. Id.
142. Id.

143. U.S. CONST. amend. YX
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are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."14 4 The congressional commerce
power is one of the specific enumerated powers granted to the federal
government. 14 5 Although this power has historically been established
as a remarkably expansive power, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that it is not without limits.1 4 6 Therefore, legislation created under the Commerce Clause must "operate within the framework
of this federal-state balance."147
a. FederalInfringement on State Education
In order to maintain this balance, Congress must respect areas
that are traditionally reserved for the states and refrain from legislating in them without a truly national purpose. Areas where state authority has traditionally been superior include those that "in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of
the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State."148 One specific area that has historically been considered a
state responsibility is the management of education.149 Acceptance of
the government's argument that regulation should be allowed of activities based upon their adverse effect on the educational process would
leave the door open for Congress to directly regulate within this traditionally state domain.15o The Lopez Court recognized that if they extended the congressional commerce power to include the authority to
enact statutes similar to § 922(q), Congress would then have an implied authority to decide that the school's curriculum has an adverse
affect on classroom learning and hence, significantly affects interstate
commerce. 15 1 Accordingly, Congress would be able to mandate that
states enact a particular school curriculum.152 Such direct federal
control over the educational process would undeniably be an intrusion
into an area where states have historically been sovereign. This intrusion would simply not be justifiable under the Commerce Clause.
Apparently, Justice Breyer did not fear Congress' urge to bring almost all things American within its Commerce Clause grasp. In his
dissent, he asserted that § 922(q) did not interfere with the exercise of
local or state authority.153 It is unfathomable how Justice Breyer
144. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995)(quoting The Federalist No.
45, at 292-293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)).
145. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8, cl. 3
146. See sources cited supra notes 22-27, 36, 72-76 and accompanying text.
147. Farmer, supra note 17, at 1676.
148. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
149. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 (5th Cir. 1993).
150. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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could maintain such a belief that is so clearly contrary to not only the
Framers' intentions, but also to years of judicial precedent. Throughout his dissent, Breyer focused on the impact of violence and guns on
students in the educational system and the quality of education in the
classrooms.154 Based on his belief that education is "inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy", he held that Congress' authority to enact § 922(q) is unquestionable because the "economic links"
between education and commerce necessitate a finding that interstate
commerce is substantially affected by the presence of guns in or near a
school zone. 1 55
Under Breyer's rationale Congress would have the authority to

regulate every aspect of the educational system. If the educational
system is so "inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy"
even the most remote and trivial aspect of the management and operation of the educational system would have a substantial affect on interstate commerce.1 5 6 Although Breyer argued that not all aspects of
education would be subject to regulation under his theory of Comthat the limmerce Clause jurisprudence, the majority correctly noted
7
itations he articulated were "devoid of substance."15
Additionally, Breyer argued that the possession of a gun in or near
a school zone could reasonably be classified as a commercial activity.158 He contended that educating children in reading, writing, and
other basic skills serves a commercial purpose and thus, § 922(q) is
constitutional under the majority's economiclcommercial activity theory.' 5 9 Breyer's reasoning that education is a commercial activity
stemmed from his notion that businesses are less likely to locate in
communities where violence plagues the classroom.160 From this he
inferred that families would not move to these communities "where
students carry guns instead of books."161 He then inferred that "interstate publishers therefore will sell fewer books and other firms would
sell fewer school supplies where the threat of violence disrupts learning."162 In summation, he stated that these local instances "taken together and considered as a whole, create a problem that causes serious
human and social harm, but also has nationally significant economic
dimensions."163
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1659-64.
Id. at 1659-61.
Id. at 1659.
Id,at 1632.
Id. at 1664.
Id.
Id. at 1663.
Id.
Id.
Id-
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Although Breyer focused on the rational basis standard of review,
his compilation of inference upon inference exceeds the boundaries of
rationality and logic. Under Breyer's reasoning, congressional authority under the Commerce Clause would have absolutely no limits. If
teaching reading and writing in a primary or secondary school is a
commercial activity, it is difficult to envision what would not constitute a commercial activity. As the majority noted, Breyer's reasoning
would make even regulation of family law a constitutionally permissible concept. 16 4 It is evident that if § 922(q) had been upheld under
Breyer's rationale, federalism and all of the dreams and ideals of this
nation's Framers could one day be shattered by an omnipotent Congress that finds its life force in the Commerce Clause.
b. Formulationof a FederalPolice State
In addition to education, the enactment of criminal laws is another
area which traditionally falls within the realm of state responsibil-

ity.165 The Framers expressly granted the federal government limited

criminal jurisdiction over counterfeiting of United States securities
and coins, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, offenses
against the Law of Nations, and treason. 16 6 The limited criminal jurisdiction set out above deals with crimes against the federal government itself and does not indicate that federal jurisdiction was
intended to include crimes affecting the local community. 16 7 Moreover, Chief Justice Marshall explicitly pronounced that it is "clear that
Congress cannot punish felonies generally."168 Thus, based on the

principles of our Founding Fathers, a congressional exercise of a federal police power would unequivocally be an unconstitutional intru164. Id. at 1633. The majority noted that '[under the dissent's rationale, Congress
could just as easily look at child rearing as 'falling on the commercial side of the
line' because it provides a 'valuable service - namely, to equip [children] with
the skills they need to survive life and, more specifically, in the workplace.'" Id.
165. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982) (Under our federal system, "[tihe
States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.");
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945)(plurality opinion)("Under our
federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States except
as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.").
166. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 6, 8.
167. Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the FederalJudiciaryFrom the Federalizationof State Crime, 43 KAN. L. REv.
503, 508 (1995).
168. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1648 (1995)(quoting Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)). The Lopez Court concluded from this that
"whatever effect ordinary murders, or robbery or gun possession might have on
interstate commerce (or on any other subject of federal concern) was irrelevant to
the question of congressional power." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1648 (1995).
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sion of the federal government into an area of traditional state
sovereignty.
Currently, we are on a road that could logically lead to the creation
of a general police power for the United States government.16 9 Congress has expanded the limited federal criminal jurisdiction by enacting statutes to cover such things as the disruption of animal
enterprises,1 70 transfer of a firearm to a juvenile,1 7 1 receipt of fire74
73
arms by a nonresident,17 2 drive-by shootings,1 theft of livestock,1
75
176
theft of major artwork,1 domestic violence,
failure to pay child
support17 7 and career criminals.178 These statutes do not involve
crimes against the federal government itself, rather, they are local in
nature and could be dealt with effectively at the state level. If crimes
as inherently local as domestic violence can fall within the scope of
federal regulation, it is difficult to conceive of any crime that could
escape federalization. Although Justice Breyer maintained in his dissent that "acceptance of the government's rationales would not authorize a general federal police power, he is unable to identify any
activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not."'17 9 The
majority in Lopez noted that the inevitable consequence of accepting
the government's contentions would be a federal police state. 8 0 The
government's arguments directly thwart the intentions of the Framers
who deliberately withheld from Congress a plenary police power enabling it to enact comprehensive criminal legislation.'18 Realizing the
Framers' intent, the Lopez Court stated that if it:
wish[ed] to be true to a Constitution that does not cede a police power to the
Federal Government, our Commerce Clause's boundaries simply cannot be
'defined' as being 'commensurate with the national needs' or self-consciously
intended to let the Federal Government 'defend itself against economic 1forces
82
that Congress decrees inimical or destructive of the national economy.
169. See Moore, supra note 6.
170. Animal Enterprise Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1992 & Supp. V. 1993).
171. 18 U.S.CA. § 922(x)(1)(West Supp. 1995). There is also a federal statute prohibiting the mere possession of a handgun by a juvenile. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(x)(2)(West Supp. 1995).
172. 18 U.S.CA_ § 922(a)(9)(West Supp. 1995).
173. 18 U.S.C.A- § 36 (West Supp. 1995).
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2317 (1988).
175. 18 U.S.CA § 668 (West Supp. 1995).
176. 18 U.S.C-.A § 2261 (West Supp. 1995). This statute defines the offense as crossing a state line (or leaving Indian country) with the intent to injure, harass, or
intimidate the person's spouse or intimate partner and causing bodily injury to
such spouse or partner. Id.
177. Child Support and Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 228, 3663, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3793,
3769cc-3797 (1992).
178. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988).
179. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632 (1995).
180. Id. at 1633.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1650-51.
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V. PROBLEMS WITH THE FEDERALIZATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW
A. Overburdening of the Federal Judiciary
This "federalization trend" and its effect on the federal judiciary
has been a recognizable problem since 1925 when "Professor Charles
Warren complained of '[t]he present congested condition of the dockets
of the Federal Courts and the small prospect of any relief to the heavy
burdened Federal Judiciary, so long as Congress continues, every
year, to expand the scope of the body of Federal Crimes.' "183 In 1959,
when addressing the problem of the ever-increasing federal caseload,
Chief Justice Warren reminded Congress that "it is essential that we
achieve a proper jurisdictional balance between the federal and state
court systems, assigning to each system those cases most appropriate
in light of the basic principle of federalism ... "184 Although this has
clearly been perceived as a problem for over sixty years, Congress consistently ignores the negative impact its actions have on the federal
courts and fails to recognize that federal courts are an exhaustible resource designed to play a specialized role in the judicial system.38 5
1. Effect on the FederalDocket
While Congress has been federalizing crime after crime in its current "tough-on crime frenzy," the federal judicial system has been paying the price.1S6 Several commentators1 8 7 have noted that the federal

judiciary is facing an "impending crisis of docket overload."18 8 In
1990, the Ninth Circuit's Chief Judge Clifford Wallace and others
formed the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States in hopes of setting a" 'judiciary wide' agenda
for years to come." 18 9 Recently, members of the 1994 Long Range
183. William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalizationof the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. Rsv. 651, 656 (1994).
184. Id.
185. Kathleen F. Brickey, CriminalMischief: The Federalizationof American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1165 (1995).

186. Mengler, supra note 167, at 507.
187. See Gehrig, supra note 131; Maloney, supra note 23; C.J. William H. Rehnquist,
Address, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Court, 1993 Wis. L.
REv. 1 (1993); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supranote 183; H. Scott Wallace, The Drive
to Federalize is a Road to Ruin, Camn. JusT., Fall 1993, at 8; Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 79
MIN. L. REV. 455 (1994); Farmer, supra note 17.
188. Mengler, supra note 167, at 523.
189. Rory K. Little, Myths and Principlesof Federalization,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029,
1038, n.39 (1995). "This Committee has a prestigious membership; it is chaired
by Judge Otto R. Skopil, Jr., of the Ninth Circuit and has eight other federal
judges as members, as well as a full time staff and a number of consultants and
contributors." Id.
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Planning Committee discussed the "'crisis' caused by the burgeoning
workload" and the threat posed to the "core values of the federal judicial system ...

."190 Due to the continual creation of new federal

crimes, the federal docket has been flooded with additional criminal
cases, and as a result the federal criminal caseload has increased from
27,968 cases in 1980 to 44,919 cases in 1994, a 70% increase.' 9 1 Federal judges spend over half of their time deciding these criminal cases
districts "criminal trials account for 80% of the
and in some
caseload."192
In addition to overburdening the federal judiciary with an everincreasing criminal docket, the federal civil docket is also feeling the
impact of the federalization trend.'9 3 "As the federal criminal
caseload has grown, the federal courts have performed a necessary
triage"19 4 because the Speedy Trial Act,'-95 requires that courts dispense with criminal cases through trial or dismissal within seventy
days.' 9 6 Consequently, the federal criminal docket takes priority over
the civil docket and important civil cases are continually delayed
while courts are forced to deal with predominately minor local criminal cases.' 9 7 For instance, in 1991, important civil issues dealing with
challenges to EPA clean air and water standards and a complex consolidation of 30 cases arising from the collapse of the National Bank of
Washington were forced to take a back seat while the court dealt with
criminal cases involving local street crime.198 Recently, the civil

docket has become so backlogged that in a case dealing with the constitutionality of the use of a pre-employment urinalysis test, the district court judge recommended that the plaintiff seek a preliminary
injunction, which the judge would deny, in order to get the case imme190. Id. at 1039-40. See e.g., Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts
22 (1994)[hereinafter 1994 Long Range Plan].
191. Mengler, supra note 167, at 505.
192. Chippendale, supra note 187, at 456. See also Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet
Too Few: New Principlesto Define the ProperLimits for Federal CriminalJurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 984 (1995)(Between 1980 and 1992 the number of
defendants prosecuted rose 78%(38,033 to 67,632), the number of drug cases filed
in federal court quadrupled from 3,130 cases to 12,833, and firearms prosecutions
also quadrupled from 931 to 3,917).
193. See generally Sara Sun Beale, Reporter'sDraft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When Consideringthe Federalizationof CriminalLaw, 46 HASTINGs
L.J. 1277, 1289 (1995)("Between 1980 and 1993, the number of civil trials declined by twenty percent, from 13,191 to 10,527.")
194. Beale, supra note 192, at 988.
195. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
196. Id.
197. Chippendale, supranote 187, at 473; see also Beal%, supra note 193, at 990 (citing
as examples of minor local crimes bogging down the federal courts the $20 sale of
two rocks of crack cocaine and youth first offenders arrested as couriers).
198. Wallace, supra note 188, at 12.
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diately heard in front of the appellate court.19 9 Clearly something
needs to be done. It is ludicrous for federal courts to spend a majority
of their time dispensing with cases that could be handled just as effectively, if not more so, at the local level.
2.

Effect on FederalJudicial Resources

Federalizing criminal law has resulted in a snowball effect in that
the "enforcement of criminal laws requires resources at every step of
the way - police officers to investigate and apprehend suspects, prosecutors to bring them to justice, public defenders to represent the indigent, . . . trial judges to preside over the proceedings . . . [and]
appellate judges to hear criminal appeals. . . ,"200 Presently, the federal judiciary lacks the necessary resources to handle its constantly
growing caseload effectively.201 "[M]any federal courts lack the staff
and facilities needed for their existing workloads, and judges in many
district courts and courts of appeal are working to capacity."2 0 2 Continuation of the current federalization trend will inevitably result in a
dramatic change in the structure and character of the federal judiciary. 20 3 The 1994 Long Range Plan estimated that "more than 4,000
federal judges will be needed by the year 2020 if the federal caseload
continues to increase at the same rate . . "204
Moreover, because a substantial share of federal resources are exhausted on criminal cases duplicative of state court jurisdiction, Congress is not only wasting federal resources, but it is also "risking
neglect in the enforcement of exclusively federal crimes, such as tax
evasion and government procurement fraud."205 The federal courts
were created to serve the public, but the constant usurpation of traditional state authority through the federalization of criminal law "undermines the capacity of federal courts to meet public expectation and
retain public confidence."206
If federal courts began exercising the broad range of jurisdiction traditionally
allocated to the states, they would lose both their distinctive nature and, due
to burgeoning dockets, their ability to resolve fairly and efficiently those cases
of clear national import and interest that properly fall within the scope of federal concern. Under that unfortunate scenario, all courts - federal and state
- might 2as
well be consolidated into a single system to handle all judicial
business. 07
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Beale, supra note 192, at 990.
See Brickey, supra note 185, at 1146.
Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 183, at 684.
Id.
Beale, supra note 192, at 992.
Id. Currently the federal judiciary consists of slightly over 800 judges. See Mengler, supra note 168, at 525.
205. Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 183, at 684.
206. Id. at 682.
207. Beale, supra note 192, at 992.
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It is clear that the federal judiciary cannot take over the "lion's share"
of criminal responsibility due to the magnitude of the criminal
caseload and the small size of the federal judicial system. 20 8 Congress
must reexamine its allocation of federal judicial resources and decide
what is truly in the nation's best interest.
B. Experimentation in Local Laboratories
Sixty years ago, Justice Brandeis was insightful enough to call attention to a state's ability to "serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country."2 09 Commentators credit local experimentation as a key
source of valuable guidance and insist that "the seeds of a solution for
many of our crime problems are more likely to arise through experimentation at the grassroots level."21 0 Specialized drug courts, community policing, boot camps, and sentencing guidelines are all trends
in criminal enforcement that were initially formulated at either the
state or local levels.211 However, future solutions to current problems
will never be developed if Congress continues to federalize every aspect of criminal law because "federalization inhibits state experimentation and adaption."212 If local experimentation is abandoned, it
seems doubtful that the crime problem facing this country will ever be
resolved at either the local or national level. Accordingly, Congress
should cease federalizing criminal law and allow states to maintain
their independent authority.
Additionally, these predominately local problems are more efficiently dealt with through state control because local courts are more
attuned to community standards.213 For instance, state and local
prosecutors (and some judges) are elected to their offices; therefore,
they are responsible to and in touch with their local constituencies.2 1 4
This factor facilitates political accountability, forcing local law enforcement officials to give greater thought to their actions because of
the direct effect on their constituents. Federal courts are so far removed from the local setting that it is difficult for them to tailor criminal law to fit local circumstances. 2 5 State and local governments are
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 183, at 666.
Mengler, supra note 167, at 517.
Beale, supra note 193, at 1295.
Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 183, at 666.
Chippendale, supra note 187, at 470. See also Bruce Fein, In Law Enforcement
Waltz States, Locals Ought to Lead, N.J.L.J., June 6, 1991, at 19 (arguing that
"state and local prosecutors are more closely attuned to local standards of fair-

ness than their federal counterparts.").
214. Beale, supra note 193, at 1294.
215. Chippendale, supra note 187, at 470 (recognizing that firearm legislation neces-

sary for New York may not be necessary in Montana).
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more adept at applying criminal law in their respective arenas simply
because they are "better able to focus on the unique impact that a
problem may have on a relatively discrete geographical or socioeconomic region." 2 16 Also, the federal government lacks local social services and outreach programs that are effective resources in the
enforcement of criminal law.217 Application of federal criminal law to
states and local communities is generally less effective because federal
courts often lack sensitivity to local concerns due to their focus on the
national agenda.218
C.

Arbitrary and Inefficient Enforcement

Congress' federalization frenzy can be partially attributed to the
public's intense desire to wage a war on crime. Increasing pressure is
placed on politicians to reverse the escalating crime rate and make the
streets safe once again. However, by federalizing criminal law, Congress is not meeting the public's demands; rather, it is "raising law
enforcement costs without lowering the crime rate ...."219 Part of the
reason for this result rests with the inconsistent application and enforcement of federal criminal law.220 Decisions to prosecute certain
criminals under federal law are not based on solid ground; they are
usually grounded in arbitrariness.221 The majority of the federal
criminal statutes are duplicative of state criminal codes; therefore, offenders are often subjected to a "kind of cruel lottery, in which a small
minority of the persons who commit a particular offense are
selected
for federal prosecution and subjected to much harsher sentences
.. *.."222
Due to the arbitrary application of federal criminal laws, it is
not uncommon in multi-defendant litigation for codefendants to receive radically different sentences. In United States v. Palmer,2 23 the
defendant prosecuted in federal court received a ten year sentence,
while his codefendant, who was prosecuted at the state level, received
no jail time.2 24 This type of arbitrary application of federal criminal
law "frustrates deterrence and devastates the balance of justice and
216.
217.
218.
219.

Mengler, supra note 167, at 516.
Beale, supra note 193, at 994.
Id. at 520.
Chippendale, supra note 187, at 467.

220. Id.
221. Schwarzer & Wheeler, supranote 183, at 52. One example is the implementation
of"Federal Day" in which certain districts sweep all drug and weapons offenders
arrested that day into federal court. Id.
222. Beale, supra note 192, at 998. Sentences available in federal prosecutions are
often ten to twenty times higher than those available in state court. A defendant
subject to a five year mandatory minimum sentence in federal court could receive
a sentence of zero to ninety days in state court. Id.
223. 3 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1120 (1994).
224. Id. at 305 n.3.
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fairness that citizens have a right to expect in the administration of
law."225 Federal prosecutions are often utilized merely to set an example for other criminals.226 However, this purpose undermines
rather than increases the effectiveness of federal criminal law.
VI.

RECOGNITION OF A NEED TO HALT FEDERALIZATION

A. National Recognition
Despite the constant increase in the number of federal crimes,
there are signs that courts are beginning to reexamine Congress'
power to enact criminal legislation under the Commerce Clause.
Many professionals within the criminal justice system are beginning
to realize that the congressional "federalization trend" must be halted
if our federal judiciary is to survive. 22 7 The 1990 formulation of the
Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference was an
"unprecedented effort to anticipate and guide the future of the federal
courts in the face of an undeniably 'accelerated pace of social
change' "228 Recently, the Committee's 1994 Long Range Plan recommended that "Congress should review existing federal statutes with
the goal of eliminating provisions no longer serving an essential federal interest."2 29 Additionally, a Three-Branch Roundtable on state
and federal jurisdiction was conducted and it was "agreed that the
time is ripe for a reexamination of the principles used to federalize
2 3o
criminal law."
Moreover, current members of the United States Supreme Court
have publicly acknowledged that this trend is a growing problem and
225. Wallace, supra note 187, at 52.
226. Beale supra note 192, at 1000-01. In Pennsylvania, in order to persuade defendants to plead guilty in state court, a press release was issued describing a case in

which a small time drug dealer refused to plead guilty to state charges with a
four year sentence, and was later sentenced in federal court to life imprisonment

without parole. Id. at 1001 n.91.
227. Chippendale, supra note 187, at 465. Professor Richard Epstein has begun to

argue for a more restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause. He observes that
there is a "powerful tension" between the post-New Deal legacy and the original
understanding of the commerce power. He argues that the Commerce Clause is
"far narrower in scope than modem courts have held." Id. at 465 n.51.
228. Little, supra note 189, at 1038, n.39.
229. Id.
230. Beale, supra note 193, at 1277. The Roundtable focused on two main areas of
concern:
(1) the increasing criminal caseload is placing a strain on the federal
courts, Bureau of Prisons, and other components of the federal criminal
justice system; and (2) the increasing federalization of crime has the po-

tential to cause an unplanned but nonetheless fundamental change in
the relationship between the federal government and the states and in
the character of the federal courts.
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have weighed its impact on the federal judiciary. Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted that society has begun to look more and more to the
federal courts to solve the nation's problems due to the federalization
of criminal law and, as a result, the court system has become
overburdened and clogged.23 1 He warned that something has to be
done.232 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor criticized President Clinton's
1994 crime bi11233 because it would create more federal crimes that
would swamp the already overburdened federal courts. 2 3 4 O'Connor
cautioned that this trend of "dumping crimes into the federal courts"
was dangerous and could have a "drastic effect on the federal
23

bench."

5

In addition, the fact that lower federal courts are aware of the "impending crisis" is evidenced by lower court opinions. 2 3 6 Prior to the
Supreme Court's Lopez decision, several challenges to § 922(q) were
brought before courts throughout the nation. 23 7 Even courts which
upheld § 922(q) expressed concern over the breadth of Congress'
238
power under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Ornelas,
the court expressed regret at having to rule the way it did because it
believed that "Congress' legislative power under the Commerce
Clause has become a virtual blank check... ."2s9 In United States v.
Morrow,2 40 the court ruled that § 922(q) was constitutional, but observed that Congress has "systematically whittled away at the old
idea of the superiority inherent in the local solution of problems
.... "241 The judiciary has recognized that "political pressures to be
perceived as 'tough on crime' are driving Congress to federalize crimes
.. in circumstances where clear-minded objective analysis can dis231. Rehnquist, supra note 187, at 1-9.
232. Id.
233. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
234. Harriet Chiang, O'Connor Says Crime Bill Would Overload Federal Courts, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 17, 1994 at A3.

235. Id.
236. See cases cited supra note 132.
237. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Edwards, 13
F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993). See also United States v. Daniels, 874 F. Supp. 1255
(N.D. Ala. 1995)(upholding § 922(q)); United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327
(D. Kan. 1994)(striking down § 922(q)); United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp.
1087 (D. Colo. 1994)(striking down § 922(q)); United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp.
450 (D. Kan. 1994)(upholding § 922(q)); United States v. Holland, 841 F. Supp.
143 (E.D. Pa. 1993)(upholding § 922(q)); United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp.
364 (N.D. Ala. 1993)(striking down § 922(q)).
238. 841 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Colo. 1994).
239. Id. at 1092.
240. 834 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
241. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
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cern no meaningful effect on interstate commerce in the sense in2
tended by the Commerce Clause."24
Recognition of this problem has occurred outside of the judicial system as well. Although President Bush did sign the Crime Control Act
of 1990,243 he recognized that § 922(q) "inappropriately overrides legitimate State firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law
...

"244

Attorney General Janet Reno has "repeatedly warned against

overreliance on federal criminal laws and spoken of a need to develop
Varia rational division of the federal-state responsibilities .. .245
ous politicians, including Senator Joseph Biden, have also spoken out
against Congress' current frenzy to federalize criminal law.2 46 The
National Sheriffs' Association has stated that it is beginning to fear
the current penchant for the "federal government infringing on the
states' police power ... and getting closer to a federal police state."247
During the Reagan Administration a report was published attacking
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Perez for undermining federalism.248 It is clear that the problem this country faces with
the federalization of criminal law is gaining national recognition.
B.

Opportunity Declined

In light of the recognition of federalization of criminal law as a nationally pressing problem and the growing desire to halt this trend,
the Lopez Court had the perfect opportunity to render a landmark decision drastically limiting congressional authority to initiate federal
criminal legislation. Based on the climate of the country, such a
landmark decision would likely have received substantial support.
The only group that would conceivably have been disconcerted by such
a ruling is Congress. 24 9 "Congress has an 'underdeveloped capacity
242. United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Colo. 1994).
243. Maloney, supra note 23, at 1801 (quoting statement by President George Bush
upon signing S. 3266, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6696-1 (Dec. 3, 1990)).
244. Maloney, supra note 23, at 1801 (emphasis added).
245. Wallace, supra note 187, at 55.
246. Id. at 54. Senator Biden complained that some 'judges and other court personnel
are overwhelmed by the sheer volume of their dockets" and that "[m]any small
cases - against first-time offenders or low-level runners -.
. . are brought in

federal courts rather than in the state courts that are equally competent to hear
them." See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 183, at 677-78, 682.
247. Wallace, supra note 187, at 54.
248. Chippendale, supra note 187, at 475.
249. Viewing such a ruling as a judicial expression of being soft on crime control, citi-

zens might also have been initially disconcerted. However, the ultimate effect of
such a landmark decision would not have been a softening of crime control. On
the contrary, it would have led to increased effectiveness in the enforcement of
criminal laws. Such a ruling would simply have shifted enforcement from the
federal forum to its traditional domain - the local/state forum.
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for self-restraint;'" therefore, they are not likely to favor any decisions
25 0
that place limitations on their power to regulate and enact laws.
Despite this apparent willingness to limit congressional commerce
power, the Court opted not to utilize Lopez to halt the federalization
frenzy. Subsequent case law indicates that the language employed by
the Lopez Court lacked sufficient strength to have a significant impact
on the federal judicial system. 25 1 In United States v. Oliver,252 the
Ninth Circuit faced a constitutional challenge to the federal caijacking
statute and explicitly stated that "the recent decision in United States
v. Lopez [did] not alter [its] view."25 3 Accordingly, the court held the
statute was constitutional. 254 Had the Lopez opinion addressed with
more force the congressional abuse of its commerce power, Oliver
might have had a different outcome.
Additionally, if the Lopez Court had established more stringent
limitations on Congress, many of the lower courts which upheld the
constitutionality of the federal carjacking statutes prior to the Lopez
decision might have had reason to reconsider their holdings. Furthermore, a post-Lopez challenge to the Drug Free School Zone Act 2 55 was
defeated and the court explicitly stated that the Lopez decision did not
mandate that it rule the statute was unconstitutional.256 In many of
these post-Lopez challenges to federal criminal statutes, the courts
might have reached different conclusions had the Lopez Court rendered a stronger opinion explicitly limiting Congress' use of its commerce power to enact statutes enlarging the federal criminal
jurisdiction.
C.

Impact on Congressional Restraint

Although the Court's decision in Lopez might have little substantial effect on future Commerce Clause jurisprudence because it failed
to create absolute limits on the seemingly infinite congressional commerce power, the Lopez decision might have some impact on Congress
itself. For over seventy years, Congress essentially had free reign to
regulate under its commerce power because the Supreme Court upheld every piece of legislation based on the Commerce Clause. Due to
the extended duration in which Congress acted with virtually no limits on its Commerce Clause power, it is plausible that Congress mistakenly viewed its commerce power as infinite. The Lopez decision
could be a wake-up call for Congress, reminding them that there are
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Chippendale, supra note 187, at 480.
See cases cited supra note 132.
60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 550.
Id.
21 U.S.C. § 860 (1990).
United States v. Garcia-Salazar, 891 F. Supp. 568 (D. Kan. 1995).

1996]

FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW SLOWED

149

limits on its power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Lopez
manifested the Court's willingness to draw the line at a certain point
and hold that Congress had gone too far.
Whether Lopez will have any impact on Congress is yet to be seen.
If it has, federal regulation of local criminal activity should decrease.
Congress will be unwilling to enact controversial legislation if it believes that the Court is apt to strike it down. Yet, the potential future
impact of Lopez on Congress must be evaluated while keeping in mind
the constant pressure from the American public for Congress to be
tough on crime. Members of Congress like to keep their constituencies
happy; therefore, public sentiment could offset any impact that Lopez
might have. The impact of Lopez on congressional restraint will only
become apparent after the passage of time.
VII. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO AN IMPENDING CRISIS
In light of the apparent ineffectiveness of Lopez, another solution
to this problem must be devised. There have been a wide variety of
theories "contemplating the best means possible for solving the impending crisis facing our overburdened federal judiciary. Among the
proposed solutions are suggestions for the expansion of the federal judicial system, a proposed commission to study the federal criminal
code and determine which statutes are excessive, more congressional
restraint, and more prosecutorial discretion. However, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has suggested the best possible solution, one that would not
only solve the present crisis, but remain true to the concept of federalism. Rehnquist suggested that "resources could be better devoted to
the war on crime in a manner that supports state efforts and preserves a more traditional allocation between state and federal criminal jurisdictions.257
Moreover, "[mluch of the Roundtable discussion centered on the
desirability of providing federal resources to the states, rather than
enacting new federal offenses or appropriating additional funds for
more federal enforcement."258 Rather than deplete federal resources
by creating federal crimes that duplicate state penal codes, federal resources should be funneled to the states to aid them in dealing with
essentially local crime. In regard to public school zones and gun control, a majority of states have already enacted statutes similar to the
federal Gun Free School Zones Act. Federal funds should be used to
aid states in their enforcement of these local statutes and to encourage
states without similar laws to enact them. One Congressman suggested that the federal government provide states with "seed money"
to encourage them to adopt programs that have proved successful in
257. Rehnquist, supra note 187, at 6-7.
258. Beale, supra note 193, at 1299.
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other states. 259 This solution promotes the use of states as laboratories to experiment with the control of crime, in addition to revitalizing
traditional federalism.
The federal government should spend its resources on effectively
overseeing its limited criminal jurisdiction, and the additional resources expended in the quest for a federal criminal code should be
allocated to the states. There are areas of criminal law in which a
federal statute is more practical than a state statute. However, this is
a finite category and it is limited to areas where there is truly a pressing national need, where multi-state litigation is involved, when the
activity involves a highly sophisticated enterprise that goes beyond
state resources or expertise, or when dealing with widespread state or
local corruption. 2 60 Federal jurisdiction should not be expanded to include areas that traditionally have been considered to be within a
state's sovereignty, such as family law, education, and local crime.
A reallocation of federal resources would not only aid states as they
strive to fight the "war on crime," but it would also shift the federal
focus to the areas of criminal law within its original jurisdiction. The
federal government's role in criminal enforcement would return to one
of assistance rather than domination over the states. 2 61 If this return
were effectuated, the impending threat to the federal judiciary and the
on-going formation of a national police state would be eliminated. The
dreams and ideals of the Framers would once again be a reality.
Victoria Davis '97

259. Id.
260. Mengler, supra note 167, at 502.
261. Id. at 517.

